

DNS Process-in-the-middle Attack

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Demonstration

- Today, I will demonstrate DNS spoofing.
- This uses special network
 SSID: BADBOY
- You don't like this demonstration, use ICANN SSID: ICANN






Attacks to DNS

- DoS to servers
 - Send many queries to DNS servers
 - It is mere disturbance.
 - It's easy, but attacker gets benefit?
- DNS data spoofing
 - Induce to another site
 - Phishing: economical benefit
 - Alternative root

Jp



RFC2833 Threat Analysis





Process-in-the-middle attack

- packet intercept
 - tcpdump dst port domain
 - Shared ethernet
 - Wireless (using Shared WEP key)
 - Hot spot everywhere
 - tap at the Router or Switch
 - Cut cables and tap
- Parse query packet
- Generate Fake DNS answer
- Write to the Network Interface





Attack tools

- There are SEVERAL... here are three
- dnshijack
 - somewhere in the Internet
- uso800d
 - It's made by Yuji Sekiya, WIDE Project.
 - for Linux
- This attack tool (dnsattack.c)
 - To research and demonstrate for DNSSEC
 - Two days work, originally 400 lines C code
 - It uses BPF and pcap
 - It runs on *BSD and MacOS X





DNS attack experiment in WIDE

- at WIDE Project Research camp
 - about 200 testees
 - announce 15 minutes DNS attack experiments without start time
 - Any DNS 'A' query is induced to a specific address.
 - At the inducement destination, we prepared web server, SSH server, ...
- Environment
 - Wireless LAN, 11A, 11B multiple channels, (WEP)
 - DNS attack tools on portable PC
 - Inducement destination PC
 - recording (tcpdump) PC
 - Sekiya's uso800d, fujiwara's attack tool



DNS attack result

- Found 100 IP addresses from tcpdump
- 90% IP addresses were induced to fake web site.
- evaluation by dig, 80% answers were induced.
- Some people ignored ssh warning of host key change.
- Some failure to forge
 - Wireless channel problem (Only a part of channel was attacked.)
 - Wireless reachability (Between user station and forging station)
 - Already cached DNS data is faster than forging.
 - This tool did not support IPv6 DNS resolving





Experiment validity

- No need to consider this attack in ethernet switch environment?
- We can attack using ARP Poisoning/ARP Spoofing
 - To Confuse Switch's ARP table
- On 802.11x environment,
 - No shared key, cannot intercept packets
- At the shared network, we can attack all protocols directly, some people says protecting only DNS is useless.
- But, DNS forging raises efficient phishing.



Demonstration

- Use special network
 - SSID: BADBOY
- If you don't like this demonstration, use ICANN SSID: ICANN
- <u>Please refrain from important new</u> <u>communication.</u>
- Now, I start the attack program.
- Let's see web.
- Most access will be induced to special site.
- How do you think ?



Restore from this demonstration

- Change SSID to 'ICANN'
- WindowsXP
 - ipconfig /flashdns
 - restart applications (Web browsers)
- MacOS X
 - lookupd –flashcache
- BSD
 - restart local caching server (If you use)
 - restart applications







Assertion

• DNSSEC may help identify and foil this kind of attack.

